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LIBEL LAW-New Mexico Adopts An Ordinary
Negligence Standard for Defamation of a Private
Figure: Marchiondo v. Brown

In Marchiondo v. Brown,' the New Mexico Supreme Court addressed
the distinction between a public and a private figure 2 in the context of a
defamation action 3 and the applicable standard of liability for libel of a
private figure. 4 The United States Supreme Court delegated to the states
the power to impose any standard of liability for defamation of a private
figure except strict liability.' Following the United States Supreme Court's
direction, the New Mexico Supreme Court, in Marchiondo v. Brown,
adopted an ordinary negligence standard for defamation of a private figure. 6 Although other jurisdictions have chosen standards of liability ranging from gross negligence to ordinary negligence, 7 ordinary negligence
1. 98 N.M. 394, 649 P.2d 462 (1982).
2. Id. at 399-400, 649 P.2d at 467-68.
3. The law of defamation is divided into slander, which involves oral communication, and libel,
which consists of printed communication. Television and radio broadcasts generally are covered by
libel, except in states which distinguish between statements made extemporaneously and statements
read from a script. See generally W. Prosser, The Law of Torts, 752-54 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as Prosser]. Marchiondo's defamation claims were founded only in libel. Therefore, this Note
will address libel only.
The New Mexico Legislature defines libel as "making, writing, publishing, selling, or circulating
without good motives and justifiable ends, any false and malicious statement affecting the reputation,
business, or occupation of another, or which exposes another to hatred, contempt, degradation or
disgrace." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-11-1 (1978). New Mexico case law defines a defamatory statement
as one which has a tendency to render the party about whom it is published contemptible or ridiculous
in public estimation, expose him to public hatred or contempt, or hinder virtuous men from associating
with him. Bookout v. Griffin, 97 N.M. 336, 639 P.2d 1190 (1982).
4. 98 N.M. at 402-403, 649 P.2d at 470-71.
5. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348 (1974), the United States Supreme Court
held that "so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves
the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of a defamatory falsehood injurious
to a private individual."
6. The New Mexico Supreme Court held:
The Gertz court, therefore, did not require proof of actual malice in cases involving
non-public defamation plaintiffs, and left it to the states to impose either an actual
malice standard or a lesser standard of fault for non-public defamation plaintiffs,
so long as the states did not apply strict liability. In accord with Gertz, we adopt
the ordinary negligence standard as a measure of proof necessary to establish liability
for compensation for actual injury.
98 N.M. at 402, 649 P.2d at 470.
7. The two minority rule standards are actual malice and gross negligence. For an example of a
case holding that a private figure plaintiff must prove the equivalent of the actual malice standard,
defined in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), as the defendant's knowledge that
the statement was false or that it was made with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not,
see Diversified Management Inc., v. Denver Post, Inc., Colo. _
653 P.2d 1103 (1982). In
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is the majority rule.8 In Marchiondo, however, the New Mexico Supreme
Court failed to state what factors it would consider in applying the ordinary
negligence standard in libel cases.
This Note is a three-part overview of the basic conflict between the
media's right to publish and an individual's right to maintain a good
reputation and not be defamed. First, the Note provides the reader with
prior common law and case law developments which have attempted to
resolve this conflict. Second, the Note analyzes the Marchiondo holding
in light of this historical development. Third, the Note analyzes how the
Marchiondo decision could be clarified to reflect the realities of modern
publication practices.'
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
William C. Marchiondo, plaintiff-appellant, is a criminal defense attorney who filed suit in 1975 against The Albuquerque Journalnewspaper
and its editor, Robert A. Brown. Marchiondo claimed he had been libeled
by an article published in the Journalentitled "Organized Crime Showing
Interest in New Mexico". He alleged that he had been libeled by "innuendo" by the juxtaposition of the headline and his photograph. MarDiversified, the Colorado Supreme Court extended the New York Times actual malice standard from
cases involving public officials and figures to cases addressing a private figure's involvement in
matters of general or public concern. Id. at 1106. The New York rule, enunciated in Chapadeau v.
Utica-Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975), is
the most strict. It requires a private figure to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
publisher acted in a grossly irresponsible manner without due consideration for standards of newsgathering and dissemination ordinarily followed by responsible parties.
8. At least eighteen other jurisdictions have adopted the ordinary negligence standard. For a
reference to the leading ordinary negligence cases, see Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill.2d 184, 340 N.E.2d
292 (1976); Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975); McCall v. CourierJournal and Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981).
9. Two issues resolved in Marchiondo but which are beyond the scope of this Note are: (1) the
court's consideration of Marchiondo's right to full discovery of the identity and state of mind of
persons involved in the editorial process surrounding the alleged libelous publications and (2) the
subsumation of common law fair comment within constitutionally protected opinion. 98 N.M. at
397-99, 403-404, 649 P.2d at 465-67, 471-72. For further discussion of the fair comment privilege,
see Note, Libel-The Defenses of Fair Comment and Qualified Privilege, 11 N.M. L. Rev. 243
(1980-81).
10. 98 N.M. at 397, 649 P.2d at 465. The article was written by an independent team of reporters
belonging to Investigative Reporters and Editors, Inc. (IRE), which had spent five months investigating the threat of organized crime in Arizona. Albuquerque Journal, Feb. 16, 1983, at A3, col.
4. During the investigation, the founding member of IRE was killed in a car bombing in Phoenix,
Arizona. Id. Following the death, the New York director of IRE assigned an IRE reporter to interview
the plaintiff, Marchiondo. Id. at col. 5. During the interview, the reporter asked Marchiondo about
his friendship with James Napoli. Albuquerque Journal, Mar. 26, 1977, at B 14, col. 4. In the article,
Marchiondo stated that Napoli was a good friend of his and that he was a "beautiful person." Id.
Additionally, Marchiondo stated in the article that he had represented Napoli's son in an armed
robbery case and had won. Id. The Journal article stated that law inforcement sources had described
Napoli to IRE reporters as "one of the five leading Mafia chieftains" in New York City. Id. This is
one example of a specific implication made by the Journal that Marchiondo was connected with
organized crime.
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chiondo claimed that the Journal used this publication to tie him to
organized crime. In addition, Marchiondo asserted that the Journal had
libeled him in an editorial it published entitled "Our Choice-Joe Skeen,"
by the following language: "as a criminal lawyer, Marchiondo thrives
by having friends in key places." 11 The editorial was written in the context
of Marchiondo's friendship with the then Democratic gubernatorial candidate Jerry Apodoca who was opposed by Republican Joe Skeen. Marchiondo argued that the language imputed to him a crime, unethical and
unprofessional conduct, a lack of legal competence, and it tended to
render him contemptuous or ridiculous in public estimation.' 2
The Journal responded to Marchiondo's libel claim by filing a motion
to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. At the same
time, the Journal moved to postpone a ruling on Marchiondo's motions
to compel answers to depositions. The trial court denied the Journal's
motion to dismiss Marchiondo's claims. The court held that Marchiondo
was not a public figure for all or limited purposes, and that Marchiondo
could not recover presumed or punitive damages because he failed to
prove the Journal had acted with actual malice. '
The New Mexico Supreme Court permitted Marchiondo to obtain immediate review of the trial court rulings. 4 The supreme court upheld the
trial court ruling that Marchiondo was not a public figure because he had
not injected himself voluntarily into a public controversy with the Journal,
but rather, had been drawn involuntarily into a private controversy with
the newspaper. The court ruled that Marchiondo, as a private figure, need
only prove ordinary common law negligence and not actual malice. The
court did not state what factors it would consider as proof of ordinary
common law negligence in libel cases.' 5
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
In order to fully appreciate the impact of Marchiondo v. Brown on
New Mexico libel law, a modern practitioner should understand how
defamation law has developed. The historical development will be dis11. 98 N.M. at 400, 649 P.2d at 468; The Albuquerque Journal, Nov. 3, 1974, at A4, col. 1-2.
12. 98 N.M. at 400, 649 P.2d at 468.
13. Id. at 395-96, 649 P.2d at 463-64.
14. The trial court certified its rulings for interlocutory appeal to the New Mexico Court of
Appeals. Id. at 396,649 P.2d at 464. The court of appeals declined to hear the appeal. Id. Marchiondo
filed with the New Mexico Supreme Court a writ of certiorari directed at the court of appeals. Id.
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals' denial of Marchiondo's appeal. Id. In the interest
of time and efficiency, Marchiondo was granted an interlocutory appeal directly to the New Mexico

Supreme Court. Id.
15. Id. at 399-400, 402, 649 P.2d at 467-68, 470. The supreme court remanded to the trial court
the issue of whether the Journal had libeled Marchiondo by innuendo with the organized crime
article. Id. at 404, 649 P.2d at 472. As to the editorial regarding Marchiondo's friendship with
Apodaca, the supreme court held that it was absolutely privileged as a constitutionally protected
opinion. Id. at 400, 649 P.2d at 468.
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cussed in two parts. The first part outlines the basic common law requirements of a defamation case and includes a discussion of publication
privileges and defenses available to a defendant. The second part highlights the significant United States Supreme Court opinions which have
shaped modem libel law. The Note culminates with an analysis of Marchiondo v. Brown rulings on the public versus private figure distinction
and the adoption of the ordinary negligence standard. Throughout this
Note, the reader should bear in mind that defamation law is an attempt
at resolving the historic tensions between the reputational interests of an
individual and the first amendment interests of freedom of speech and of
the press. Keeping this in mind, the courts' struggle in balancing these
interests can be better understood.
A. Common Law Defamation
1. A Prima Facie Case.
Defamation is the invasion of an individual's interest in a good reputation.16 The opinions which members of the community hold about the
plaintiff as a result of the defendant's acts are relevant in a defamation
case." Consequently, a plaintiff in a defamation action must prove that
the defendant communicated, to a third person, a false statement "of and
concerning" the plaintiff. The statement must have actually damaged the
plaintiff's reputation or caused personal humiliation, mental anguish or
suffering.18 Ambiguity exists as to what type of statement is defamatory.
Narrowly defined, a defamatory statement tends to cause a plaintiff to be
hated, ridiculed, disgraced, or avoided. " Specific categories of defamation are: imputation of a serious crime involving moral turpitude,
insanity, loathsome disease, unchastity, and business incompetency.20
Statements which would diminish the esteem, respect, confidence, or
goodwill with which others regard the plaintiff are defamatory.21 Therefore, any false statement may be defamatory if it tends to cause others
to think less of the plaintiff. Whether a statement is defamatory is a
question of fact.
Defamation also can arise by implication or "innuendo." In order for
innuendo to be defamatory, the words or statements must convey a defamatory meaning under the circumstances when considering the publication as a whole.22 It is not necessary that anyone believe them to be
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See Prosser, supra note 3, at 737.
Id. at 739.
Id. at 737; Times, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 460 (1976).
See Prosser, supra note 3, at 739.
Id. at 739-41.
Id.
Id.at 746-49.
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true, but absence of belief does affect the amount of damages awarded. 2 3
When determining whether the plaintiff has been defamed, one must
determine whether the statement made was "of and concerning" the
plaintiff. Usually only defamation of living persons is actionable. 24 Defamation of one who is dead is actionable only if the statement reflects
on those still living .25 In addition to defamation of actual living persons,
corporations also may be defamed when statements cast aspersion on the
corporation's prestige, credit, standing in the community, or other business character.26
2. Defenses.
After the plaintiff presents his prima facie case, the defendant may
raise several defenses to wholly or partially avoid liability. Defenses are
classified as either complete or qualified. Examples of complete defenses
are truth and absolute privilege. Examples of statements covered by the
qualified privilege are those made in the common public interest, regardless of whether that interest is moral, pecuniary, educational, or
simply newsworthy. 27 A defense is either complete or qualified depending
upon the balance struck in the law between the policies involving an
individual's reputational interests and the societal interests advanced by
the publication. Conduct which otherwise would be actionable may escape
liability because the defendant was acting in furtherance of some interest
of social importance. 28
The defendant can absolve himself of liability entirely by proving the
existence of truth or absolute privilege. However, before the truth of a
statement can be determined, the court must decide whether the statement
is one of fact or one of opinion. The distinction is based upon the notion
that a false opinion or idea is non-existent. 29 An absolute privilege covers
opinions and ideas. False statements of fact are not protected because
they possess no constitutional value which materially advances the purpose of freedom of speech: to foster "an uninhibited, robust and wideopen debate on public issues. "30 Therefore, the first amendment protects
only ideas, opinions, and truthful statements of fact.
Relevant factors in determining whether a statement is one of fact or
one of opinion are: (1) consideration of the statement within the context
of the publication as a whole; (2) the extent that truth or falsity may be
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id. at 744.
Id. at 744-45.
Id.
Id. at 776-785.
Id. at 776.
98 N.M. at 400-401, 649 P.2d at 468-69.
Id. at 400, 649 P.2d at 468.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13

determined without resort to speculation; and (3) whether reasonably
prudent persons reading the publication would consider the statement to
be an expression of opinion or a statement of fact. 3 Therefore, the defendant can avoid liability completely under the truth defense only if he
publishes a truthful statement of fact or a constitutionally protected opinion.
Absolute privilege is afforded to judicial, executive, or legislative proceedings.32 The rationale underlying the privilege is that government
officals should be free to administer their offices without fear of negative
consequences resulting from statements made during the course of the
proceedings. Identical policy considerations grant the same type of protection to jurors and witnesses in these proceedings. However, this immunity extends only to statements made by those persons within the scope
of their professional duties.33 In addition to the immunity provided the
speakers of such statements, the press also may be privileged when reporting these statements because the proceedings during which these
statements are made generally are considered newsworthy. 4 Similarly, a
complete defense is afforded to broadcasters of political speeches."
In contrast, qualified privileges cover an almost unlimited range of
statements. It has been said that a publication is covered by a qualified
privilege when it is "fairly made by a person in the discharge of some
public or private duty, whether legal or moral, or in the conduct of his
own affairs, in matters where his interest is concerned." 36 Generally,
qualified privileges extend to statements made by the defendant in furtherance of an interest deemed important to the publisher, a specific group
of people, the public in general, or a person who acts in the public
interest. 37
The privilege is "qualified" because the statement is immune from
liability only if published in a reasonable manner and for a proper pur31. Id. at 401, 649 P.2d at 469.
32. See Prosser, supra note 3, at 777-84.
33. Id. at 777.
34. Id. at 830.
35. Broadcasters of political speeches are protected from liability for libel because they are required
under the fairness doctrine of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 to provide all political
candidates with equal time and the broadcasters are not empowered to censor the candidates' speeches.
47 U.S.C. §315 (1976).
36. See Prosser, supra note 3, at 786.
37. Id. Within the category of interest to the public in general fall "fair comment" and "matters
of public concern." Id. at 792, 822-30. Statements are privileged as "fair comment" if they are
made about the conduct and qualifications of public officials, employees, or candidates for public
office. Id. at 828-30. Subjects which are considered "matters of public concern" are those paid for
with public funds, admission or disbarment of attorneys, and the management of institutions, such
as schools, charities, and churches. Id. at 822-23. Similarly, acts by a private enterprise which
affect general interests of the community, such as pollution of the water supply, employment and
racial discrimination, and transportation services, also may be commented on under the public interest
privilege. Id.
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pose.38 Although there is no clearcut definition of "reasonable manner"
and "proper purpose," these terms generally refer to the publisher's
intent. Traditionally, a qualified privilege could be lost if the defendant
published the defamatory statement with the intent to injure the plaintiff.
At common law this intent was labeled malice, meaning ill will. Today,
although intent still is required, the constitutional definition of malice is
not that the statement was made with ill will. Rather, the test is whether
the statement was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless
disregard for its truth. 3 9 To be absolved partially of liability under a
qualified privilege, the publisher must prove: (1) that he acted reasonably
under the circumstances; (2) that he did not know of the falsity of his
40
statement; and (3) that he did not intentionally disregard the truth.
Conversely, the plaintiff may attempt to defeat the defendant's privilege
by asserting that the defendant acted unreasonably and with knowledge
4
of the falsity of the statement or with intentional disregard for the truth. '
A defamation plaintiff generally can hold a defendant liable for libel
if he proves that the defendant published a false statement of fact "of
and concerning" the plaintiff to a third person. But the defendant may
avoid liability if he can prove that the published statement of fact was
true or that the publication was a constitutionally protected opinion. Alternatively, a defendant may limit his liability in two ways. First, the
defendant's statement may be absolutely privileged if the publication arose
out of an official legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding. Second,
the defendant's statement may be covered by a qualified privilege if the
statement was published in the common public interest. In addition to
establishing these essential elements, the outcome of libel cases often
turns upon the court's classification of the plaintiff as either a public or
private figure. This classification determines which standard of liability
applies to the defendant's acts in a given libel case and will be discussed
in the next section.
B. The United States Supreme Court Speaks
The law of defamation has evolved from a mixture of conflicting common law and first amendment doctrines. The United States Supreme Court
decisions in this area reflect the Court's struggle to balance the individual's
reputational interests with the press's right to publish freely. Initially, the
Court focused on a commitment to the press's "uninhibited, robust and
wide-open" debate of public issues. 42 The Court chose the applicable
standard of liability by inquiring whether the plaintiff was involved in an
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 786, 792.
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S 254, 280 (1964).
See generally Prosser, supra note 3, at 792-96.
Id. at 796.
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
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issue of public interest. But in more recent decisions the Court has placed
greater emphasis on protecting the individual from defamation and has
adopted a fault standard based upon the plaintiff's status as a public or
a private figure.
The first major United States Supreme Court decision on libel was New
York Times v. Sullivan.43 In New York Times, the Court addressed the
standard of culpability which an elected public official would be required
to prove in order to recover damages for defamation arising from a
statement criticizing his official conduct. The Supreme Court held that
first amendment constitutional protections of freedom of speech and press
require a public official, seeking damages relating to his official conduct,
to prove that the statement was false or was made with reckless disregard
for its truth or falsity." The rationale for the actual malice standard for
defamation of a public official was to provide the press with a right to
foster a free and open debate on public issues, but at the same time, to
protect individuals from clear abuses of this power.45
The New York Times' holding was premised upon the idea that freedom
of expression was designed to maintain the "opportunity for free political
discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of
the people" '4 6 so that desired political and social changes could be obtained
by lawful means.4" The Court reasoned that because such persons chose
to be administrators of the government, the press should not be punished
43. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). New York Times involved an advertisement in a Montgomery, Alabama
edition of the New York Times newspaper. The advertisement, entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices,"
was intended to raise funds to support the civil fights movement. The ad criticized the police reaction
to the civil fights demonstrations by characterizing it as an unprecedented "wave of terror." Id. at
257. The ad exaggerated the police reaction by making such statements as:
[T]ruckloads of police armed with shotguns and tear-gas ringed the Alabama State
College campus. When the entire student body protested to state authorities by
refusing to re-register, their dining room was padlocked in an attempt to starve
them into submission. . . .Again and again the Southern violators have answered
Dr. King's peaceful protests with intimidation and violence. They have bombed
his home almost killing his wife and child.
Id. The plaintiff Sullivan, Montgomery City Commissioner of Public Affairs, claimed that because
he was responsible for the actions of the Montgomery police, the advertisement's references to
public wrongdoing constituted accusations of wrongdoing on his part. Id. at 258. The jury rendered
a verdict for Sullivan, granting him $500,000 damages. Id. at 256. The Alabama Supreme Court
of law which had been applied in the
affirmed. Id. The United States Supreme Court held the rule
Alabama courts was unconstitutional. Id. at 264. The Court also held that for a public official to
recover for libel, he must prove actual malice. Id. at 281.
The Court defined actual malice as when the defendant acts "with knowledge tha [the statement]
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. at 280. This proof requirement
has since become known as the New York Times actual malice test. Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S.
323, 343 (1974).
44. 376 U.S. at 280.
45. Id. at 279.
46. Id. at 269.
47. Id.
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for publishing criticism of these officials.48 The Court noted, however,
that an official does not lose his right to a constitutionally protected
reputation merely by becoming a government official, but rather, that
such right is contingent upon a finding of actual malice on the part of
the defendant."
On the issue of actual malice, the Supreme Court found that the New
York Times published the statements without knowledge of their falsity
or reckless disregard for their truth.5" Thus, the Court concluded that the
newspaper had not libeled Sullivan.5 Had Sullivan been able to prove
that the New York Times knew or should have known the publication
contained untruths, it is likely he would have recovered under the Court's
standard.
The Supreme Court extended the application of the actual malice standard from public officials to public figures in Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts.52 A public figure is one who has attained his status either through
his position or by "purposeful activity amounting to a thrusting of his
personality into the vortex of an important public controversy." 53 A person
need not hold public office to be a public figure. Nonetheless, if a person
is intimately involved in the "resolution of important public questions
or, by reason of [his] fame, shape[s] events in areas of concern to society
at large," then he may be considered a public figure.-'
In applying this definition, the Court held that a public figure could
recover damages for a defamatory falsehood, the substance of which
48. Id. at 272-73.
49. Id. at 282.
50. Id. at 285-86.
51. Id.
52. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts was consolidated and decided with a
companion case, Associated Press v. Walker. Curtis involved an article published in petitioner's
Saturday Evening Post, which accused Butts, athletic director for the University of Georgia, of
"fixing" a football game between the University of Georgia and the University of Alabama. Although
the University of Georgia is state-owned, Butts was not employed by the state, but by a private
corporation, the Georgia Athletic Association. Butts was a well-known and respected figure in
coaching, and, at the time of the article, he was negotiating for a coaching position with a professional
team. Based upon his fame and connections with the University, the Supreme Court considered
Butts to be a public figure. Id. at 144-48, 154.
Associated Press v. Walker arose from a published eyewitness account of events on the University
of Mississippi campus on a night when federal efforts to enforce a court decree ordering Negro
enrollment resulted in a massive riot. The story stated that Walker personally had led a violent crowd
against the federal marshals on campus. The story also stated that Walker had encouraged rioters to
use violence against the officers. Walker was a private citizen at the time of the riot and publication;
however, he had taken a firm stand against federal action in segregation. Moreover, Walker had an
extensive career in the United States Army and had commanded federal troops during enforcement
of school segregation in Little Rock, Arkansas, before resigning to engage in political activity.
Based on Walker's own purposeful acts, the Court held that he was a public figure. Id. at 15455.
53. Id.at 155.
54. Id.at 164.
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made it apparent that the individual's reputation was substantially endangered. The public figure had to show that the defendant had exercised
highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the
standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers. 5 It should be noted that although the "highly unreasonable conduct" test is not necessarily identical to the New York Times
"knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth" actual malice standard, the two tests are basically synonymous and subsequently have been
treated as such.56 The rationale for equating public figures with public
officals was that both types of individuals play influential roles in ordering
societal issues, are able to oppose criticism of their views and activities,
and have access to the media to rebut the criticism. 7
In a subsequent case, Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,58 the Court continued
to use the New York Times and the Curtis Publishing Co. considerations
to determine whether the plaintiff had to prove actual malice or meet a
lesser standard. In that case, the defendant, Metromedia, had broadcast
a report which did not mention Rosenbloom's name, but used the terms
"smut literature racket" and "girlie book peddlers." 5 9 Rosenbloom, a
distributor of nudist magazines, sued Metromedia claiming that the broadcast was libelous and that the broadcaster had failed to exercise reasonable
care. Metromedia countered by arguing that it had no knowledge of the
falsity of the statement, nor had it acted with reckless disregard for the
truth. Additionally, Metromedia asserted that Rosenbloom was a public
figure. The Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, found Rosenbloom
was not a public figure; however, it held that because the defamatory
falsehood in the newscast related to Rosenbloom's involvement in an
event of public concern, the distribution of nudist magizines, the New
York Times actual malice standard would apply to him. I The Court stated
that even though Rosenbloom may not have assumed the risk of defamation and did not enjoy access to the media to rebut the defamation,
did not justify stifling public
as do public officials and figures, such acts
6
discussion of matters of public interest. 1
Although the Supreme Court in Rosenbloom held that the New York
Times actual malice test was appropriate, it reexamined that standard in
light of its application to private figures. Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Brennan and Blackmun reasoned that the New York Times test should be
equally applied to private figures, public figures, and public officials
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 155.
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. at 164.
403 U.S. 29 (1971).
Id.
Id..at 40-41.
Id. at 46-47.
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because a "subject of public or general interest does not become less so
merely because a private individual is involved. ,62 Moreover, the Justices
asserted that the distinction between public and private figures makes no
sense in terms of the first amendment guarantees. 63 Justice White, in a
concurring opinion, also upheld the New York Times test, but contended
that it should be limited to "official actions of public servants" and not
applicable to persons like Rosenbloom.'
Justices Harlan, Marshall, and Stewart, in a dissenting opinion, reasoned that the New York Times test should not be applied as a basis for
liability because it requires the courts to decide on a case-by-case basis
what is in the public interest. 65 Although Justice Harlan did not advocate
abandoning the New York Times rule, he asserted that the states should
develop the standard of care applicable to private plaintiffs. He reasoned
that the states have legitimate interests in protecting individual citizens'
reputations from defamation and are better suited for balancing the needs
of constitutionally unfettered speech against individual rights not to be
defamed.'
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 67 the Supreme Court implicitly overruled
Rosenbloom when it followed Justice Harlan's position and delegated to
the states the responsibility for determining the proper standard of liability
for defamation of a private figure. In Gertz, the Court held that "so long
as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for
themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of [a] defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual. "68
The Court justified this delegation of power to the states by declaring
62. Id. at 43.
63. Id. at 46.
64. Id. at 57 (White, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 62 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 64.
67. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Gertz involved a libel case brought by a prominent Chicago defense
attorney against the publisher of a John Birch Society magazine. The publication labeled Gertz a
"Communist-fronter" and falsely stated that he had arranged for the "frame-up" of a Chicago
policeman who was convicted of murdering Gertz's client. Even though Gertz had served on various
city committees, the Court held that he was not a public figure merely because of his past achievements
and his involvement in the law suit: Id. at 325.
68. Id. at 348. The scope of the Gertz holding was stated in terms of "publisher" and "broadcaster"
or "communications media." Therefore, the precise holding did not extend beyond a statement
published or broadcast by the communications media. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 580B comment
d (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975). However, the position taken by the drafters of the Restatement and
the majority of the courts which have addressed the issue is that Gertz should apply equally to nonmedia and media defendants. Id.; Jacron Sales Co., Inc. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, -, 350 A.2d
688, 694-96 (1976); Poorbaugh v. Mullen, 99 N.M. 11,653 P.2d 511, 520 (Ct. App. 1982).
The rationale for extending the Gertz rule to non-media defendants is persausive. Certainly
it would seem strange to hold that the press, composed of professionals and
causing much greater damage because of the wider distribution of the communications, can constitutionally be held liable only for negligence, but that a private
person, engaged in a casual conversation with a single person, can be held liable
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that it recognizes the strength of the legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals for actual injury to their reputations, yet it
shields the press from strict liability. 69 Thus, private individuals are protected by allowing states to set a lesser and more easily proved standard
than actual malice and freedom of press is no longer threatened by strict
liability. Moreover, the Court's ruling freed state and federal judges from
having to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues of
"general or public interest," as was required by the New York Times actual
malice test.7°
Gertz implicitly overruled the Rosenbloom application of the New York
Times actual malice test to all defamation plaintiffs, including private
figures. 7' It replaced Rosenbloom with a ruling which delegated to the
states the function of establishing fault standards for defamation of a
private individual by a media defendant.7" Consequently, the New York
Times requirement of proving actual malice now applies only to defamation cases involving public figures, but not private figures. Therefore,
even if the publication involves a subject of public or general interest,
the private individual no longer is required to prove actual malice unless
he wants to recover punitive damages. After Gertz, the operative element
of a defamation case is whether the individual plaintiff is a public or a
private figure.
In Gertz, the Court developed more fully the public and private figure
at his peril if the statement turns out to be false, without any regard to his lack
of fault.
Restatement (Second) of Torts §580B Comment d (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975). To hold a private
individual to a strict liability standard is a harsh rule because it is inconsistent with the rationale
350 A.2d 688, 695 (1976).
underlying strict liability. Jacron Sales v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, -,
Generally, strict liability is imposed in products liability cases on the theory of enterprise liability.
Id. The rationale of enterprise liability is that the cost of the injury can be spread over all the users
of a given product and one can insure against the risk of liability. Id. An individual person certainly
cannot or would not spread the risk or insure against liability arising from possibly defamatory
statements. Id.
Another reason for applying Gertz to non-media defendants is the compelling need for consistency
and simplicity in the law of defamation. Id. at -, 350 A.2d at 696. The first amendment protection
supports this principle because it extends freedom of speech and freedom of press to everyone. Id.
However, courts which hold Gertz does not extend to non-media defendants oppose the extension
of the constitutional privilege to private persons because defamatory matter does not contribute to
the purpose for the privilege: a free exchange of ideas in decision-making of a self-governing society.
593 P.2d 777, 782-85 (1979); Harley Davidson Motorsport,
Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or. 99, -,
Inc. v. Markley, 297 Or. 361, -_,568 P.2d 1359, 1364 (1977).
69. 418 U.S. at 348. The Court qualified this delegation to situations in which the substance of
the defamatory statement "makes substantial danger to reputation apparent," suggesting that if the
defamation was not obvious, a different rule might apply. Id. at 349. The Court also held a defamation
plaintiff could recover only upon' proof of actual damages. This ruling eliminates the plaintiff's
common law right to presumed damages based upon mere proof of publication.
70. Id. at 347.
71. See id. at 346-47; see also Justice Brennan's dissent. 418 U.S. at 361 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 348.
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distinction. The Court defined two sub-categories of public figures: (1)
an all-purpose public figure and (2) a public figure for a limited range of
issues. A person becomes an all-purpose public figure by achieving pervasive fame and notoriety. A limited public figure is an individual who
injects himself into a particular public controversy for a limited range of
issues. The nature and extent of an individual's participation in the particular controversy, from which the defamation arises, determine whether
a person should be classified as a public or a private figure. Therefore,
a person who has not achieved general fame or notoriety in the community,
or has not played a significant role in73a particular public controversy,
usually is classified as a private figure.
The Gertz ruling sought to eliminate the difficulties inherent in determining whether an issue was in the public interest by focusing the Court's
initial inquiry on the status of the plaintiff. The Court determined whether
the plaintiff was a public or private figure, rather than whether the plaintiff
was involved in a matter of public controversy. Yet, the Gertz standard
suffers from the same inexactness as the standard it replaces. The Supreme
Court provided no guidelines for ascertaining exactly what type of, and
how much, fame, pervasive influence, or notoriety is required to classify
an individual plaintiff as a public figure.
In classifying the petitioner-attorney's status in Gertz, the Supreme
Court looked to such factors as his involvement in community and professional organizations, his publications on legal subjects, and his partici-74
pation in the particular murder trial which gave rise to the defamation.
The Court concluded that although Gertz had been well-known in some
circles, he had achieved no general fame or notoriety in the community,
and therefore was not a public figure for all purposes. Additionally, the
Court held that Gertz was not a public figure for the limited range of
issues involved in the particular trial. He had played only a minimal role
at the coroner's inquest in that his participation related only to the representation of his client. He was not involved in the criminal prosecution
of the policeman convicted of murdering his client. He had not discussed
the criminal or civil litigation with the press. Therefore, the Court determined that Gertz had not plainly "thrust himself into the vortex of this
public issue, nor did he engage the public's attention in an attempt to
influence its outcome.""
Gertz has provided practioners and the courts with a workable but
rather inexact test for distinguishing between private and public figures.
The case gives no specific factors whereby more than a judgment call
can be made as to whether the plaintiff should be classified as a public
73. Id.at 352.
74. Id.
75. Id.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13

or a private figure. Consequently, application of the Gertz standards
requires lower courts to determine whether the nature and extent of the
plaintiff's actions, collectively or individually, are sufficient to warrant
his classification as a public figure. The inadequate guidance with which
Gertz provided state courts is illustrated in Marchiondo v. Brown.
C. The State Court Response to Gertz: Marchiondo v. Brown
Marchiondo v. Brown 6 is the first case since Gertz in which the New
Mexico Supreme Court addressed the issue of what standard of liability
a private figure should be required to prove in order to recover for libel.
The court held that Marchiondo was a private figure.7 7 Empowered by
the United States Supreme Court in Gertz to adopt any standard of liability
except strict liability, the New Mexico
Supreme Court adopted the ma78
jority rule of ordinary negligence.
Although the Marchiondorulings certainly are justified, the court failed
to compensate for the Gertz deficiencies by providing practioners with
better guidelines for determining whether a plaintiff should be classified
as a public or a private figure. Moreover, the supreme court failed to
elaborate on what factors it would consider in applying the ordinary
negligence standard. The following discussion outlines the Marchiondo
treatment of the public figure versus the private figure distinction and the
ordinary negligence standard issues.
1. Public versus Private Figure
In Marchiondo, the New Mexico Supreme Court followed the Gertz
approach to the public versus private figure distinction. First, the court
looked to the nature and extent of the plaintiff's actions. Recognizing
that both Marchiondo and Gertz were criminal defense attorneys, the
court considered Marchiondo's status as a criminal defense attorney. The
supreme court, citing Gertz, stated, "[g]enerally lawyers, in pursuing
their profession, are not public figures unless they voluntarily inject themselves or are drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby
become public figures for a limited range of issues."

79

The supreme court

reasoned that even though Marchiondo is a well-known attorney and a
prominent member in the Democratic Party, this involvement was insufficient to depict him as a public figure. His influence in those two capacities was not "pervasive."
Turning to Marchiondo's actions in relation to the article on organized
crime, the court noted that Marchiondo had not injected himself volun76.
77.
78.
79.

98 N.M. 394, 649 P.2d 462 (1982).
Id. at 399-400, 649 P.2d at 467-68.
Id. at 402, 649 P.2d at 470.
Id. at 399, 649 P.2d at 467.
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tarily into the controversy on organized crime, but rather, had been drawn
into the controversy involuntarily. The court determined that the controversy was not public; it was a private controversy between Marchiondo
and the Journalwhich arose at the time of the alleged libelous publication.
On the basis of this analysis, the court concluded that Marchiondo was
not a public figure for the purposes of the organized crime article.80
The Marchiondotreatment of the public versus private figure distinction
suffers from the same deficiencies as the Gertz opinion. The New Mexico
Supreme Court stated that Marchiondo's influence as a private attorney
and as a person involved in politics was not pervasive, without clarifying
which factors would lead to a conclusion of pervasive influence. Additionally, the court was inconsistent in its reference to what constitutes a
public controversy.
The court suggested that organized crime is a public controversy. 81 The
court retreated from this conclusion, however, by stating that Marchiondo's relationship to the article on organized crime did not constitute
involvement in an issue of public controversy because the Journal's
suggestion of Marchiondo' s involvement in organized crime was a private
controversy between Marchiondo and the Journal.2 Although the court's
conclusion may be correct, it could be argued that all libel suits are
"private controversies" between the plaintiff and defendant. Nevertheless, the subject matter of the publication giving rise to the alleged libel,
in this case organized crime, may well be a public controversy. Assuming
arguendo that the organized crime subject matter of the Journal's article
was a public controversy, the fact that Marchiondo agreed to be interviewed for such an article may have constituted a voluntarily thrusting
of himself into a public controversy. The court refrained from exploring
such an approach to the public controversy issue.
A recent federal court of appeals decision lists some factors which
clarify the public versus private figure distinction in light of the public
controversy element. In Waldbaum v. FairchildPublications, Inc.,83 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia interpreted the Gertz allpurpose public figure as someone who is a "'celebrity'-his name a
'household word'-whose ideas and actions the public follows with great
interest." 4 The court asserted that statistical surveys of recognition of
80. Id. at 400, 649 P.2d at 468.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980). Waldbaum involved a suit
brought by the president and chief executive officer of a consumer cooperative against the owner of
a trade publication. Waldbaum claimed that an article stating that he had been replaced as president
of the cooperative was libelous because it falsely implied that the cooperative had been losing money
and that he was responsible for that loss. Waldbaum asserted that this allegedly false report damaged
his reputation as a businessman.
84. 627 F.2d at 1292.
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the plaintiff's name or prior press coverage could be considered in determining whether the plaintiff was an all-purpose public figure.85 Additionally, the court was willing to consider whether other individuals
altered or reevaluated their conduct or ideas in light of the plaintiff's
actions, and whether the plaintiff had successfully shunned public attention. Most important, however, is whether the plaintiff voluntarily made
himself prominent, whether the plaintiff assumed the risk of defamation,
and whether, once defamed, the plainiff had access to the media to rebut
the alleged defamation.86
The Waldbaum court interpreted the Gertz limited purpose public figure
as a person who has attempted to have, or realistically can be expected
to have, a major impact on the resolution of a specific public dispute.
The dispute, gauged by the belief of a reasonable person, must have
foreseeable and substantial ramifications for persons beyond its immediate
participants. 87 Following the Gertz Court, the Waldbaum court also relied
upon the "nature and extent of an individual's participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation" to determine whether
a person should be classified as a limited purpose public figure.88
In Waldbaum, the court approached the public versus private figure
distinction through two inquiries. The first inquiry requires isolating and
defining the public controversy. The court defined a public controversy
as "not simply a matter of interest to the public," but a "real dispute,
the outcome of which affects the general public . ..in an appreciable
way." 89 A public controversy is not a private disagreement which attracts
attention. It is a dispute which has received public attention because its
ramifications affect persons who are not direct participants. The fact that
a publication addresses a particular topic does not mean that the topic is
a matter of public controversy; rather, it indicates that someone in the
press believed the matter deserved media coverage. Moreover, for a
controversy to actually exist, the public must be discussing a specific
rather than a general concern. 9°
Once the court defined the controversy, its second inquiry was the
plaintiff's role within the controversy. The Waldbaum court accepted the
Gertz analysis that for individuals to be held public figures, they must
have "thrust themselves to the forefront" of a controversy for the purpose
of affecting its ultimate resolution. 9 ' The plaintiff must have achieved a
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 1295.
Id.
Id. at 1292.
Id. at 1296 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974)).
627 F.2d at 1296.
Id.
Id. at 1297.
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"special prominence" in the debate.92 He either must have been purposely
trying to influence the outcome, or realistically could have been expected
to influence the outcome because of his position in the controversy. 93 To
aid in its analysis, the Waldbaum court considered the plaintiff's past
conduct, the extent of press coverage, and the public reaction to the
plaintiff's conduct and statements. 94
Applying the all-purpose figure analysis of Waldbaum to Marchiondo,
it is clear that he is not an all-purpose public figure. While Marchiondo
is well-known within legal and Democratic party circles, he is not a
celebrity, his name is not a household word, and his actions and ideas
probably are not followed by the public with great interest.
Although under the facts it is clear Marchiondo is not an all-purpose
public figure, the issue of whether Marchiondo is a limited purpose public
figure is resolved less easily. Under Waldbaum, the first step is defining
the public controversy. According to the Waldbaum court, a public controversy is not a matter simply of public interest, but is real dispute which
affects the public and non-participants in an appreciable way. If the controversy involved in the publication is organized crime, then the public
controversy may not only be newsworthy, but it also may be an issue of
specific public concern. Organized crime does affect persons other than
its participants, albeit indirectly. Alternatively, if the controversy in Marchiondo is not organized crime, but the substance of the libel suit between
the Journal and Marchiondo, as the New Mexico Supreme Court held,
then perhaps the controversy is only newsworthy and not a specific public
concern.
The second inquiry is Marchiondo's role within the public controversy.
If the controversy is organized crime, then the fact that Marchiondo
consented to being interviewed may allow the inference that he thrust
himself into the controversy over organized crime for the purpose of
exercising influence over the reporter's conclusion of the presence of
organized crime in New Mexico. If, however, the controversy is the libel
suit, then his role probably is insufficient to label him a limited purpose
public figure.
Even though the Marchiondo decision may not have had a different
outcome if the court had used the Waldbaum analysis, the public controversy element of the public versus private figure distinction is one with
which the court could have reached a different result. The court concluded
that Marchiondo was not a public figure because it held the controversy
to be a private one between Marchiondo and the Journal. This emphasis
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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on the libel suit itself, as well as Marchiondo's lack of pervasive influence
as a criminal defense attorney and as an active Democrat, may have been
misplaced. The controversy involved in Marchiondo could have been
held to be public. The issues investigated in the article on organized crime
were in existence before publication; they did not arise solely from the
publication. Moreover, Marchiondo's consent to the Journal interview
may have constituted thrusting himself into the vortex of the public controversy such that he assumed the risk of defamation. If this approach to
the public versus private figure distinction had been used by the New
Mexico Supreme Court, perhaps Marchiondo would have been held a
public figure.
2. The Ordinary Negligence Standard.
In Marchiondo, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that a private
figure had to prove "ordinary common law negligence" in order to recover
for libel.95 In adopting the ordinary negligence standard, the court relied
upon Gertz which empowered the states to establish standards of liability
for defamation of a private figure by a media defendant. 96 The only
limitation that Gertz imposed upon the states was that a media defendant
could not be held liable for defamation without fault. 97 Although the New
Mexico Supreme Court's adoption of ordinary common law negligence
follows the Gertz ruling, the court failed to state what factors it would
use in determining negligence in defamation cases.
The Marchiondo court could have clarified its ruling by restating the
general rule that if the defendant is a professional disseminator of news,
such as a newspaper, a magazine, or a broadcasting station, or an employee of such a publisher, then the defendant is held to the skill and
experience normally possessed by members of that profession. 98 Under
this standard, negligence is determined by analyzing either the state of
mind or the conduct of the publisher or a publisher's employee. 99 Negligence in terms of the defendant's state of mind is determined by whether
95. 98 N.M. at 402, 649 P.2d at 470 (1982). The Marchiondo court followed the Gertz decision
in limiting the application of ordinary negligence to compensation for actual injury, which includes
out-of-pocket loss, impairment of reputation, standing in the community, personal humiliation, and
mental anguish and suffering. The plaintiff need not present evidence of an actual dollar value. The
effect of the ruling was to abolish strict liability for libel upon proof of publication of a libelous
statement.
96. See supra text accompanying note 68.
97. Id. Although the Gertz holding was framed in terms of recovery from a media defendant,
see supra note 68, the New Mexico Supreme Court did not define its holding so narrowly.
Since Marchiondo, the New Mexico Court of Appeals has extended Marchiondo to non-media
defendants. Poorbaugh v. Mullen, 99 N.M. 11, 20, 653 P.2d 511, 520 (Ct. App. 1982).
98. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 580B comment f, (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975). Although
such a standard traditionally has been considered one of locality or community, it should not be so
limited, especially in jurisdictions such as New Mexico, where there may be only one publisher per
community.
99. Id.
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the defendant had reasonable grounds for believing the communication
to be true. Negligent conduct is conduct which creates an unreasonable
risk of harm as compared with the type of conduct which a reasonable
person would exhibit under similar circumstances. The issue is whether
the defendant acted reasonably in determining the truth or falsity of the
statement prior to publication."
The Restatement (Second) of Torts outlines three factors for determining whether the defendant acted as a reasonably prudent publisher or
publisher's employee under the circumstances. First, the court should
determine the thoroughness of the defendant's investigation before publication, considering the amount of time the defendant had for investigation from the time the defendant first acquired the information until
the publication deadline. Second, the court should evaluate the nature of
the interests the defendant sought to promote through publication. Third,
the court should inquire into the extent of damage to the plaintiff's reputation which would result if the communication proved false. 101 These
factors illustrate a balanced judicial inquiry into the modem editorial
processes involved in publication and the individual's reputational interests.
In applying the reasonable publisher standard, the court must guard
against an abusive use of expert witnesses. 102 In an attempt to prove that
the defendant acted unreasonably in publishing the alleged defamatory
statement, the plaintiff may call another publisher as an expert witness.
The expert witness may testify that he would not have acted as the
defendant acted under similar circumstances. The reasonable publisher
standard mandates that the court not accept the testimony of a single
witness as conclusive of the defendant's guilt. On the contrary, the court
should find the defendant negligent only if he acted contrary to the usual
practices of the journalistic profession. Professional practices may be
established by written rules and regulations of journalistic societies or
associations or by very credible oral testimony based upon standard business procedures.
Another area of potential abuse of the reasonable publisher standard
is jury inference of guilt. Juries have a tendency to conclude, on the basis
of their own layman's inferences, that if the defendant published a false
statement of fact, then the defendant must have been negligent. 10 This
conclusion is erroneous because the defendant reasonably could have
believed the false statement was true. 104
The court must guard against the abusive use of expert witnesses or
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the allowance of jury inference of guilt because either could result in a
finding of liability without proof of fault. Such a result blatantly violates
the Gertz mandate of the abolition of strict liability. Additionally, the
purpose of the reasonable publisher standard is to protect publishers from
an unduly harsh application of the ordinary negligence standard.
3. The Effect of Marchiondo v. Brown.
Although the ordinary negligence standard has been adopted as the
majority rule, there is some argument that it is not the best rule. Adoption
of the ordinary negligence standard is criticized most by publishers and
members of the press. Publishers generally feel that ordinary negligence
places an intolerable burden upon the press by requiring it to pre-determine
how the jury might interpret the reasonableness of its acts. °5 Consequently, publishers' fear of libel suits has led to some self-censorship."0
Therefore, one effect of the adoption of the ordinary negligence standard
is to infringe upon, and possibly to defeat, freedom of the press, thereby
inhibiting a robust and wide-open debate on public issues.
Another effect of the ordinary negligence standard is that the press has
become reluctant to publish articles concerning the acts of individuals
other than public officials or public figures. Publishers receive greater
protection for statements made about public officials or figures under the
New York Times actual malice standard. Consequently, many valid public
interest stories involving private figures may not be published. If publishers doubt whether truth can be proved, or if they fear the expense of
having to prove truth even if they have reasonable grounds for believing
the statement1 07to be true, many publishers may refrain from publishing
such stories.
Conversely, the strongest arguments in favor of the adoption of the
ordinary negligence standard are made by persons who consider themselves private figures. Private figures assert that they need the ordinary
negligence standard to protect themselves against the press because generally they have not thrust themselves into the vortex of a public controversy, they have not assumed the risk of defamation, and, once defamed,
they do not have access to the media to rebut the defamation.' 08 Although
these arguments basically are sound, there is some doubt that public
figures actually enjoy greater access to the media to rebut criticism than
do private figures, unless they are elected or appointed officials.
Another possible effect of the ordinary negligence standard is to render
some of the defendant's absolute and conditional privileges obsolete. The
traditional absolute defense of truth is altered by the ordinary negligence
105.
106.
107.
108.

546 P.2d 81, 103 (1976).
Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, -,
, 546 P.2d at 104.
Id. at
Id.
Martin v. Griffen Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1976).
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standard because it requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant was
negligent in failing to ascertain the falsity or defamatory character of the
statement. Therefore, in order to prove negligence, the plaintiff in effect
may have to prove that the statement was false leaving the defendant to
rebut or disprove the falsity. " The conditional privileges for statements
of public interest also may be rendered valueless under the ordinary
negligence standard because those privileges are contingent upon the
defendant having no reasonable grounds for doubting the truth of the
statement. Because negligence may be an unreasonable belief that the
published statement is true, the conditional privileges will be defeated
upon a showing of negligence."'
CONCLUSION
Marchiondo v. Brown followed the Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., mandate that the state courts establish their own fault standard for awarding
compensatory damages to plaintiffs who have actually suffered damage
as a result of publication of the defendant's statements. Accordingly,
Marchiondo is written in the context of a court struggling to develop a
new standard without effective guidelines from the United States Supreme
Court. Although the Marchiondo decision has a sound analytical basis,
its inadequacies lie in the New Mexico Supreme Court's failure to carefully interpret the public versus private figure distinction and the ordinary
negligence standard. Marchiondo will have the probable effect of placing
the burden upon future courts to refine the definitions and significance
of the Marchiondo standards. There must be a more clear analysis of
what constitutes a public controversy and the role of the private and
public figure within it. The New Mexico courts should ensure that the
standard of ordinary negligence applied to media defendants is that of a
reasonable publisher or broadcaster based upon state-wide professional
practices and not jury inferences or one witness's practices. Ultimately,
however, Marchiondo has the effect of altering the timeless conflict between protecting legitimate private individual reputational interests and
promoting freedom of speech and freedom of the press by adopting a
standard which favors the individual.
LORI GALLAGHER
109. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 580B comment i (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975).
110. Id. at comment k. Another interesting but unaddressed issue is whether New Mexico courts
will apply the doctrine of comparative negligence to libel cases involving private figures and the
ordinary negligence standard. If comparative negligence were applied to codefendants in the case
of repeated publications of defamatory statements by different publications, then perhaps each
publisher would be held comparatively negligent. Alternatively, a plaintiff possibly could be held
comparatively negligent if his acts also brought about the actual injuries suffered as a result of the
publication. While it is likely the courts will find a rational basis for applying comparative negligence
to codefendants, the dOctrine should not be applied to plaintiffs because it would discourage individuals from cooperating with the press to accomplish a free flow of ideas.

